A
  SHORT HISTORY OF LAGO OIL & TRANSPORT COMPANY, LTD. 
ARUBA, N. W. I.
THE
  BACKGROUND
    The is the
  story of how Lago began; with a man in California, who moves to Mexico to
  develop the oil industry in that country and because of salt water entering
  his oil wells he moves to Lake Maracaibo, discovers a vast amount of oil but
  was unable to send it to market because the channel into Lake Maracaibo was to
  shallow to allow ocean going tankers to enter the lake, so, he builds a
  transshipping port on the island of Aruba, runs out of money, sells his
  holdings to Standard of Indiana, who builds a small refinery, and then because
  of a tax that was anticipated to be imposed on imported crude by the U S
  Government, they sell their  holdings
  to Standard of New Jersey, not for the small refinery in Aruba, but for the
  vast holding in crude oil Standard of Indiana own in Lake Maracaibo. 
  And then, because Aruba is under Dutch control, and because Standard
  Oil of New Jersey has won a contract to supply Britain with 100 octane
  Aviation Gasoline and the Avgas must be produced outside the United States,
  the Lago refinery becomes an important asset by providing the place outside
  the United States where the Avgas will be produced. 
  Thus the size of the Lago refinery is expanded to produce Avgas long
  before the United States enters World War II. 
  Because of the demand for Avgas created by the war further expansion is
  done at Lago during World War II.
    During World
  War II there was a production agreement reached between the Venezuelan
  Government and Standard Oil, which capped the amount of crude that could be
  export from the country and the amount of crude that would be processed in
  Venezuela.  This agreement capped
  the size of Lago Oil & Transport Co. Ltd. 
  at 500,000 barrels a day.  This
  agreement is the prime reason for the Lago refineries ultimate demise.  One book says the Lago refinery is not upgraded and capital
  expenditures are instead placed in a new refinery at Amuay Bay so the
  agreement can be met for processing of crude in Venezuela.  Thus, over time, Lago because of a lack of updating and new
  construction, becomes an outdated and non-profitable facility, and in time was
  closed.   A later book says
  the same thing and then goes on to say that Lago was completely upgraded and
  $384 million were spent at Lago between 1948 and 1975 to keep the refinery
  updated, although its capacity was never expanded.
    After the closing of the refinery,
  Lago began to dismantle the facility in order to be able to return the land
  lease, in its original condition, to the Dutch Government. 
  After dismantling had begun, but before it was completed, a purchaser
  was found, Costal Petroleum.  It
  should also be noted that the last two owners, Costal Petroleum and now El
  Paso Natural Gas, both seems to have also found the old Lago refinery facility
  not to be profitable, even with the updated facilities. 
  This statement is based on the fact that Costal sold the refinery to El
  Paso and now the rumor is the possible closing of the facility by El Paso
  Natural Gas.
THE
  STORY
         
  The Beginning, Pan American Petroleum
The story of Lago Oil & Transport Co. Ltd. begins with Mr. Edward L. Doheny, the founder and head of Pan American Petroleum. In May of 1900, Mr. Doheny, along with C. A. Canfield and A. P. Maginnis, made a trip to Mexico in hopes of finding oil. Upon finding oil they formed the Mexican Petroleum Company of California. This company developed the first oil fields and refineries in Mexico.
   
  On February 2, 1916, Pan American
  Petroleum & Transport Company was incorporated and had as its holding the
  following: 31 tankers, oil properties in California under the name, Pan
  American Petroleum Company, Mexican Petroleum Co. Ltd., The Caloric Company
  and British Mexican Petroleum Company.  Mr.
  Doheny was the President of this new holding company and ran it until his
  retirement in 1925; soon after Lago Oil & Transport Co. Ltd. transshipment
  facility was started at San Nicholas Bay, on the island of Aruba.  
  Mr. Doheny had been a wildcatter in California who is credited with the
  development of the first oil fields and the oil industry in Mexico. 
  
    His fields in
  Tampico were close to the Gulf of Mexico and as oil was pumped from the oil
  wells, salt water was entering the well, over time the crude oil became
  contaminated by the salt water.  With
  large contracts to supply crude to his and other refineries on the Gulf and
  East Coast of the United States Mr. Doheny, went looking for a new source of
  crude oil. 
It is interesting to note that in the book Mexican Petroleum that is printed in 1922 that Mr. Doheny drilled for oil in Venezuela in 1914. At that time he drilled wells in four locations and each site produced oil. It seems he also built a pipeline to a small refinery he had built in San Lorenzo, which is about sixty miles south of Lake Maracaibo. See footnote 1 at end.
   
  The book notes that Shell had also built a refinery on the Dutch Island
  of Curacao and Pan American Petroleum shipped 300,000 barrels of crude to this
  Curacao refinery in 1918.  In 1919
  Mr. Doheny received geologist reports that there were petroleum over a large
  area of Lake Maracaibo but because of World War I, drilling was curtailed.
  See footnote 2 at end.
   
  Early on, The
  Shell Company and Mr. Doheny had been successful in discovering oil in Lake
  Maracaibo and it was there that Mr. Doheny returned in search of a new source
  of Crude when his wells in Mexico were being contaminated by salt water. 
  His second explorations were successful and soon he was transporting
  crude by barge from Lake Maracaibo to the port of Oranjastad, on the island of
  Aruba, for transshipment to the Gulf and East Coast of the United States. 
  Mr. Doheny's Pan American Petroleum owned refineries in Louisiana and
  Savannah, Georgia.
    The Dutch
  government imposed no tax on the importing or exporting of crude, so it was an
  ideal location for the transshipment, but a more permanent site was needed
  because production was increasing.  
  Mr. Doheny contracted with Andrew Weir and Company, Ltd., a shipping
  company from Britain to provide the ships to transport of the crude from Lake
  Maracaibo to a new facility he was planning to build.   
  The site was to be selected by a representative from Andrew Weir, the
  shipping company, Captain Rogers and representatives from Pan American
  Petroleum.  After much searching a
  site was selected.  The site
  selected was San Nicholas Harbor.  At
  the time San Nicholas harbor had a small pier, in much disrepair, that had
  been use for the shipment of phosphate, that had once been mined on the east
  end of Aruba.  San Nicholas bay
  was a natural harbor, protected from the sea by a natural reef and there was a
  small narrow entrance at the West end of the reef allowing small ships to
  enter the bay.  For this bay to be
  used for the transshipment of oil the entrance would have to be widened and
  the bay would need to be dredged.  Additionally,
  piers for the new lake tankers need to be built and storage tanks and pumping
  stations for the crude would have to be constructed. 
  The group looking at the site, felt if was perfect, so after signing a
  99-year lease with the Dutch Government work was begun at the end of 1925. 
  The job was completed and the San Nicholas harbor officially opened in
  November of 1927.
It was at this time that the houses on the lower road, from the powerhouse to Rogers Beach were constructed to house the families of the officers on the lake tanker and the supervisory personnel operating the transshipping facility.
   
  At this point
  in the story we now have a crude oil transshipment facility with storage tanks
  and about 90 houses for personnel.  Pan
  American Petroleum owns the facility and the personnel living in the houses
  are English families, of officers on the lake tankers, (which are owned and
  operated by Andrew Weir) and personnel from Pan American Petroleum, who are
  operating the pumping and storage at San Nicholas Harbor.
Standard Oil of Indiana, The beginning of a Refinery
EARLY PHOTOS PHOTOS FROM THE 1950's
    Soon after
  building the transshipment facility in San Nicholas, Standard of Indiana
  purchased a stock interest in Pan American Petroleum, however they did not
  have a controlling interest in Pan American Petroleum but they continued to
  purchase stock in the company.  
Because of the large amount of crude being pumped from beneath Lake Maracaibo it was Pan American Petroleum who decided to build a refinery in Aruba, but it was Standard Oil of Indiana, because of their now large stock interest in Pan American Petroleum, who provided all the technical and supervisory personnel for the construction and operation of the refinery. Again the decision to build a refinery on Aruba was done for many reasons: Pan American Petroleum and Standard of Indiana both an eye to the foreign markets and Aruba was well situated because of its location in the world, Aruba is closer to Europe than the East Coast of the United States, thus shipping to Europe is cheaper than shipping from the U. S. Aruba also had a population of between seven and eight thousand and the men of the island were forced to migrate to Cuba to cut sugar so Standard of Indiana assumed there would be a willing and able work force on the island, and finely, and most important, was the stability of the Dutch government as compared to that of the Venezuelan Government. In Standard Oil Company (Indiana) Oil Pioneers of the Middle West Aruba is described as not an attractive tropical island and because of it being barren, it was necessary to import all the materials to construct a refinery, as well as provide everything for the care and comfort of its employees. All the technical and supervisory personnel sent to Aruba by Standard of Indiana were sent from their state side facilities, mostly from the Whiting refinery in Indiana and the Standard of Indiana refinery in Casper Wyoming. They were all housed in what had become Lago Colony, an expansion of the housing that was provided by Pan American Petroleum for its foreign staff employees and ship officer's families. See photo 1 for a view of the refinery and the small colony at the time of the sale of the facility to Standard of New Jersey. (Note: From the photo in New Horizons, which did not reproduce that well, it looks like the last road in the Colony in 1932 was the road that left the refinery gate, went up past the area later used to build the American Legion, Dr. Reeves dental office, the back of the elementary school and must have stopped at the five-way intersection by Colony Service. The houses on the lower road seem to stop at Rogers Beach. Even in the book the photo is not too clear. Dan).
   
  Construction
  was begun in May of 1928 on the refinery and by January 1, 1929 the first
  refinery units were in operation.  The
  last unit was completed in December of 1929. 
  This was, at the time, one of the most modern refineries in the world,
  with an initial capacity to process 111,000 barrels of crude a day. 
  Because it only processed the heavy crude from Venezuela the refinery
  was designed to handle only the one type of crude and thus the refinery was
  very efficient, even though the product it was processing had a high asphaltic
  base, a high sulphur content and was heavier in gravity and more viscous that
  most crude found in the United States.  The
  new refinery was both a topping and cracking plant and greatly increased the
  amount of gasoline Standard of Indiana produced.  In the end this proved costly to Standard of Indiana because
  they did not have the marketing facilities in the United States or abroad from
  which to sell the new volume of gasoline they were now producing in Aruba. 
  
    During this
  period there was a proxy fight between Colonel Robert W. Stewart, Chairman of
  the Board of Standard of Indiana and Mr. John D. Rockefeller that began over
  Mr. Rockefeller wanting Colonel Stewart to resign as Chairman of Standard of
  Indiana.  Unable to obtain a
  resignation, Mr. Rockefeller issued a statement that he had lost confidence in
  Stewart.   The court battle
  that followed dragged on for a long time and in the end Mr. Stewart lost. 
    After Stewart,
  Edward G. Seubert was made President of Standard of Indiana. Because of
  information that came out in the court fight between Stewart and Rockefeller
  over Stewart=s mismanagement of Standard Oil of Indiana (the teapot dome
  scandal), Pan American Petroleum and its holding, Seubert called for a full
  investigation of all these allegations. 
It was Seubert who, during this period, acquired full control of Pan American Petroleum, the stock swaps began in August of 1929 and by the end of 1932 Standard Oil of Indiana had 97.37 % of Pan American Petroleum's Class A stock and 95.96 % of its Class B stock.
This brings us
  to 1932 and in Aruba we have a crude oil transshipment facility, a refinery
  that processes 110,000 barrels of crude a day and a colony that extend back
  from Rogers Beach with three rows of houses. 
  Standard of Indiana now owns it, but because Standard of Indiana has no
  place to sell the gasoline it is now producing, the refinery is not
  profitable.
   
  Standard of
  Indiana soon realized that the cost of opening foreign markets would be very
  expensive and at this same time the US Government was talking about imposed an
  import tax on foreign crude imported into the United States. 
  This tax would have made the petroleum products from Aruba more
  expensive in the United States and thus unprofitable to sell there. 
  This left Standard of Indian with little, to no, foreign marketing
  facilities, and if the U. S. Import Tax were enacted, no market in which to
  sell the production from Aruba.  
    Standard of
  Indiana did not go looking for a buyer, they learned from one of their Board
  of Directors that Standard of New Jersey was interest in their foreign
  holding.  Standard of Indiana
  understood that it would take a company with large resources to purchase their
  entire former Pan American Petroleum holding and so they offer them to Shell
  Oil, The Texas Company and Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
  
  
  Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Expansion of the Refinery
    The buyer was
  Standard Oil of New Jersey. The purchase price was $140,542,292.11.  This sum was paid by $50,000.00 in Cash and $90,452,293.11 in
  Standard Oil of New Jersey stock.  Walter
  C. Teagle, the President of Standard Oil of New Jersey made the purchase, not
  so much for the refinery in Aruba, it was of little use to Standard Oil of New
  Jersey at the time, but for the known and producing crude oil reserves in
  Venezuela.  Remember that Standard
  Oil of New Jersey=s was present in Venezuela as the Standard Oil Company of
  Venezuela.  It had also purchased
  Creole Petroleum.  However, it had
  not been very successful in discovering crude on its own. 
  In fact it has been very unsuccessful. 
  This failure was a great frustration to Mr. Teagle and this prompted
  him to decide to purchase producing fields rather than try and develop fields. 
  The lack of success in discovering oil prompted Walter C. Teagle to
  first purchase Creole Petroleum, a syndicate that had producing fields in Lake
  Maracaibo.  Jersey Standard
  purchased Creole Petroleum Corporation on June 30, 1928 but the papers were
  retroactive to April 1, 1928.  At
  that time Creole Petroleum had been dealing with Lago, it had made
  arrangements with Lago Oil and Transport Co. Ltd., to use their facilities on
  Aruba to transship their crude, so at the time of the purchase of Standard of
  Indiana, there was a working relationship between Standard of New Jersey, the
  new owner of Creole, and Standard of Indiana, the owners of Lago on Aruba.
 The
  Lake Tankers, The Supply Line to the Lago Refinery
    The entire
  operation in Aruba depended on a fleet of little tankers that carried the
  crude from Lake Maracaibo, through the shallow cannel to Aruba.  Now is a good time to go into a little about the lake tanker
  fleet that served the Aruba refinery.
    The operation
  of the lake tankers (a lake tanker was a small vessel of about 6,000 tons) was
  critical to the operation of the Aruba refinery and although ownership of the
  tankers changed during the period they always operated to supply the Aruba
  refinery until after World War II.
    These lake
  tankers must have been well built, two of them, the Inverrosa and the Inverruba
  were reassigned to act as fuel oilers off the coast of West Africa, they
  served for four years without going to dry-dock or undergoing major repairs.  
  Three of the lake tankers, because of their shallow draft and flat
  bottoms, were converted into tank landing ships (LST’s); they were the Bachaquero,
  Misoa and the Tusajera. 
    The German High
  Command, realizing the importance of the refineries in Aruba and Curaçao,
  sent a task force of U-boats to disrupt the shipments of crude to these
  refineries.  In this attack on the
  night of February 16, 1942 four lake tankers, the Pedernalas, Oranjestad,
  Tia Juana, and the San Nicholas, were torpedoed and three sank and
  the forth, the Pedernalas, was beached with her mid-section, (the
  bridge and ships steering), destroyed.  She
  was taken to the dry dock at Lago, the mid section was removed and the fore
  and aft section welded together, a temporary wheel house was added at the
  dry-dock in Aruba and she made it to Baltimore under her own power, where a
  new amidships section was added.  These
  four lake tankers had a total crew of 102 and of those, 47 lost their lives.  This attack put a great strain on the remainder lake tankers
  to supply crude to the Aruba refinery.
    Before the
  attack the lake tankers were not protected, after the attack operations were
  restricted to daylight hours and naval destroyers escorted the tankers.  
  This practice lengthened the turnaround time from 2.58 days to 4 days. 
  The loss of the four-torpedoed tankers cut the amount of crude carried
  to Aruba by 115,700 barrels per day.  This
  was another contributing factor to the loss of production at the Aruba
  refinery in 1941. 
    This loss of
  production prompted the Maritime Commission to approve the construction of
  seven new lake tankers under wartime conditions, using materials that were in
  short supply. 
    The contract
  for these seven lake tankers was signed on April 30, 1942. 
  The contract was for a shallow-draft, twin-screw, steam-powered tanker
  of the Boscan class.  These
  tankers were designed to have a capacity of 5,650 tons and a speed of about 10
  knots. The contract to build these new ships was signed with the Barnes-Duluth
  Shipbuilding Company of Duluth, Minnesota. 
  The first tanker was delivered on July 1, 1943 and the seventh tanker
  was delivered on in October 1943.  The
  San Joaquin was delivered on August 27, 1943, the Caripito on
  September 10, 1942, Temblador on September 20, 1943, San Cristobal
  on September 28, 1943, Guiria on October 21, 1943, Guarico on
  October 28, 1943 and Valera on November 8, 1943.  The Valera was torpedoed on March 7, 1944 off the
  coast of Barranquilla, Columbia while carrying a cargo of fuel oil from Aruba
  to the Panama Canal.  All of the
  crew and officers, except for the Captain, escaped the burning, sinking ship
  and were rescued.
    To get these
  new lake tankers to Aruba they were sailed from Duluth, Minnesota, through
  Lake Superior, the St. Mary=s River, Soo Locks, the northern section of Lake
  Huron, Mackinac Straits, the entire length of Lake Michigan to Chicago,
  through the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Cannel, the Des Plaines River, the
  Illinois River and into the Mississippi and down to New Orleans. 
  The trip had to be made in daylight hours, as there were no night
  navigational aids on the rivers at the time. 
  It was a distance of 2,247 miles and one tanker took 28 days and the
  shortest time to make the trip was 15 days.
    In New Orleans
  the tankers were again dry-docked, defense equipment was installed,
  (presumably deck guns) the wheelhouse and mast were added and the bottom was
  again painted before going on to Aruba.  Because
  of low bridges encountered on the trip the ships could not have a height in
  excess of 53' 6".  Therefore,
  they left the Duluth shipyard without a wheelhouse cover, superstructure or
  masts. See footnote 3 at end.
 Post
  World War II, the Phasing Out of Lago
    During World
  War II, the channel to Lake Maracaibo was constantly being dredged.  After World War II the channel dredging was completed thus
  allowing large ocean going tankers to enter the lake and receive crude. 
  Further crude could also be picked up at the new refinery that was
  built at Amuay Bay.  According to
  Auke Visser, the last of the lake tankers were sold 1954. 
  Many were put to other uses and some were scrapped.
    The Amuay
  refinery was opened on January 3, 1950.  This
  refinery received its crude by the Ule-Amuay pipeline, which in effect
  eliminated the need for small lake tankers to carry crude to Amuay. 
  Also, the channel to Lake Maracaibo had been dredged to allow the
  passage of deeper draft tankers.  The
  channel between Lake Maracaibo and the Gulf of Venezuela and the Caribbean Sea
  was through the Tablazo Strait.  This
  cannel was originally twelve feet deep and in the dry season it was ten feet
  deep and full of moving sand bars.  
  When the Amuay refinery was completed, the channel had been dredged to
  allow the passage of much larger tankers. 
  With the channel dredged, the small obsolete lake tankers were replaced
  by four larger (32,000 dead weight tons (DWT), tankers. 
  These new tankers were a little more than five times as large as the
  small lake tankers they replaced.  These
  were the Esso Amuay, Esso Caripito, Esso Maracaibo and the Esso
  Caracas.     Here there seems to be a conflict between what
  Auke Visser writes in the paper & what Bennett H. Wall writes in Grown
  in a Changing Environment.  Auke
  Visser stated that the last small lake tanker was sold in 1954, while Wall
  states the last small lake tanker; the Esso Mara was retired in 1960. 
  Whatever the case, the new larger tankers, sailing under the Venezuelan
  flag with Venezuelan crews replaced the smaller lake tanker and began to bring
  crude to Aruba.  They would take
  on a partial load in La Salina, leave the lake through the deeper channel, top
  off crude at Amuay, which had been delivered by the new pipeline, and then
  sail to Aruba with a full load.
 Lago
  Oil & Transport Co. Ltd., Aruba, N.W.I. 
  
&
 
  Management & Employee Relationship & Local Education
Now
  back to the development of the Aruba refinery.
   
  On April 30, 1932, a contract was entered into between Standard of Jersey and
  Standard of Indiana for the purchase of all foreign properties and American
  tankers that had once been owned by Pan American Petroleum As soon as Standard
  Oil of New Jersey purchased the refinery from Standard of Indiana they began
  to expand the refinery in Aruba. The reasoning behind expanding the refinery
  was primarily because Aruba was under control of the Dutch Government and
  considered a much more stable place for investment than was Venezuela. 
  Another reason was the location of Aruba in relationship to world
  markets.  As
It is also interesting to note that in Chapter 5 of New Horizons, A History of the Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) mention is made that the Standard Oil of New Jersey had a commitment to develop each new oil field in Venezuela with its own community and to provide housing and community facilities. It goes on to say that as costly as this commitment proved to be, it was felt that it was necessary to keep people in underdeveloped countries. Although nothing is said about the Colony in Aruba, this theory seems to have spilled over to Lago in Aruba because, as Standard Oil of New Jersey expanded and development the refinery it, also expanded Lago Colony and Lago Heights, as well as the housing that was built with loans guaranteed by Lago for the purchased by hourly employees in Essoville.
   
  Another very
  important reason for the expansion of the Aruba refinery was the development
  of the high compression aircraft engine. 
  During the middle 30's the US Army Air Corp. as well as the British Air
  Ministries were experimenting with high compression aircraft engines that
  required a 100-octane gasoline to make the engines efficient. 
  In 1936 it was the decision of the Army Air Corp. to adopt 100 octane
  gasoline for all combat planes.  It
  seems this decision was made before there was a means of making iso-octane in
  large quantity.  
    To produce this
  high (100) octane gasoline a process had been developed by Shell Oil, used hot
  sulfuric acid in a catalysis process.   
  This hot acid process produced a product, which was known as a
  copolymer.  The copolymer was then
  hydrogenated and this process doubled the ios-octane yield from the refinery. 
  
At this same time the British Air Ministries were negotiating with Standard of New Jersey to supply them with the new 100 octane gasoline. The negotiations for this purchase hinged on the 100 octane gasoline being produced and supplied from a facility that was not within the continental United States. This was because of neutrality legislation in the US that would restrict the export of war materials in the event of war. The Aruba refinery was under Dutch control and the British Air Ministry signed a contact with Standard Oil of New Jersey with the understanding that the Avgas facility would be built in Aruba and thus be exempt should the U. S. impose an embargo on the export of war material, which Avgas would be considered to be. As soon as the contract was signed, construction was begun on the copolymer and hydrogenation plants in Aruba. The Aruba refinery now had the units with which to produce the 100 octane gasoline for the British. This prewar construction set the stage for Lago’s role as a major supplier of high octane gasoline as well as other petroleum products to U. S. and Allied forces during World War II.
The British Air Ministry had contracts for 100 octane gasoline from Esso and Shell, both supplying the gasoline from their refineries in the Dutch Caribbean as well as Standard-Vacuum Oil Company in Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies. With Italy entering into the War on the side of Germany the Mediterranean became closed to traffic through the Suez Cannel, so the 100 octane from Sumatra had to be shipped around the horn of Africa. Thus, the British became even more dependent on Aruba to supply them with 100 octane gasoline. The Neutrality Act of 1937 also limited the sale of 100 octane gasoline on credit to the British. Britain was in short supply of cash so this Act cut off their supply of 100 octane gasoline from the United States. This Neutrality act also restricted the use of tankers flying the U. S. Flag to carry war material. For this reason Esso Shipping transfer many of theirs tankers to Panama Transport so it was able to transport petroleum products across the Atlanta to Britain. Most of the ships that were transferred in 1939 had American crew. Again American neutrality regulations forbade the employment of American Crew on the ships of a foreign registry so when the ships were transferred to the Panamanian flag the crews were replaced with Canadians, Norwegian and Danes.
    Beginning with
  the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, 100 octane aviation gasoline
  became one of the most important factors in the defense of the island.
  (Britain) That gasoline gave the British Spitfires and Hurricanes an advantage
  in combat over the German Luftwaffe, with its far larger number of planes but
  fuel of lower quality.  Geoffrey
  Lloyd, British Minister of Fuel and Power, later said; 
  “I think that without 100 octane we should not have won the Battle of
  Britain.  But we had 100
  octane.”  100 Octane gasoline
  was described as the super fuel that meant more speed, more power, quicker
  takeoffs, longer range, & greater maneuverability that allowed the British
  planes to defeat the superior German Luftwaffe.  
    During the
  Battle of Britain, between August 8 and September 3, 1940, the Luftwaffe lost
  1197 aircraft. The British lost planes.  From
  September 4 to the 30 the Germans lost 955 planes while the British only lost
  267 planes.  No longer able to
  sustain the high loss of aircraft, the Germans switched to nighttime raids. 
  This reduced their losses but not the ration of German to British
  aircraft lost and they were not as successful in causing damage to the
  targets.  In November of 1940 the
  Germans sharply reduced their night raids on Britain.
    With the
  development of the catalectic cracking process, which is done by a massive
  unite, referred to as, The Cat Cracker,@ 
  Lago in Aruba was selected as one of the three refineries to be fitted
  with this new unit.  Work on the
  Cat Cracker began in 1942 and the unit went on line December 1943, with a
  daily capacity of 14,000 barrels of 100/130 octane Avgas per day. 
  
In the early 40's, with the advance of Germany into the countries of Europe, the markets of Lago’s production shipped to Europe dried up. Notice the large drop in production for Lago in 1940. As the battle of Britain raged, production increased and then fell in 1942. This was due to two factors: 1) as the U. S. entered the war, but was still not completely tooled up for war, petroleum consumption dropped. 2) The drop in production at Lago in 1942 can also be attributed to the loss of the four lake tankers and the shortage of crude being delivered to the refinery.
   
  As stated
  before, Standard of New Jersey and the Venezuelan Government had entered an
  agreement during World War II that would require Esso to build and refine
  crude in Venezuela and this agreement capped the export of crude to Aruba at
  500,000 barrels per day.  Both New
  Horizons & Growth in a Changing Environment and Growth in a
  Changing Environment, state that this agreement stopped investment in
  improvements in the Aruba refinery after World War II.
    However Growth
  in a Changing Environment contradicts itself and states that after World
  War II the Aruba refinery continued to be improved, 
  with investments amounting to more than $60 million between 1949 &
  1959 and another $64 million between 1959 & 1967. 
  Then between 1968 and the early 70's Standard Oil of New Jersey spent
  $260 million to install fuel oil desulfurization facilities to meet U.S.
  Environmental standards.  It
  further states that by 1975 Lago operated a complete and flexible fuel
  products refinery with a capacity of 500,000 barrels a day.  It consisted of crude and vacuum distillation, visbraking,
  allylation, naphtha fractionation, hydrogen plants and hydrofining/go-fining
  for desulphurization of naphthas, kerosene, gas oils, sulphur recovery, and a
  sulphuric acid manufacturing plant. This sounds like the refinery was kept up
  to date but not expanded beyond the 500,000 barrels per day production.
    A look at
  production figures, see Table 4, shows the rapid grown of the Aruba refinery
  and the magnitude of it size compared to other Standard Oil of New Jersey
  holding in the United States, Europe or the Eastern Hemisphere. 
  Aruba’s Lago Oil & Transport Co. Ltd. refinery was the largest
  the Jersey family from 1933 until 1950, (I have as yet not been able to find
  figures on actual production by the Aruba refinery after 1950, probably
  because they were fixed at 500,000 barrels per day).
    A little needs
to be said about Management and Labor at Lago. 
It is noted in History of Standard Oil (New Jersey) New Horizons, 1927-1950
that in the late 1920's, the management of Standard Oil refineries began to
change.  Before 1929 the leadership
of Jersey’s refining were men who had learned the petroleum business in the
School of Experience.  In the late
1920 that began to change and in 1934  Lloyd
G. Smith, a 1913 graduate of chemical engineering from the University of
Illinois was appointed manager of the Aruba Refinery. 
This was to usher in the beginning of the new college educated
management.  Lloyd G. Smith was
succeeded by John J. Horigan, and then Odis Mingus, Walter A. ABud@ Murray, J.
M.  Ballenger and R. L. Trusty. 
These were the managers up to 1975. 
    In 1936 out of
a total work force at the Lago refinery of 2,810, about 790 were from outside
the Caribbean area. These outsiders held nine executive positions and all but
two of the 138 supervisory posts.  They
also filled most of the skilled positions. 
Arubans and other islanders held the remaining 2,020 unskilled positions. 
This meant a veritable babble of tongues and diverse backgrounds and the
imbalance was not conductive to good morale. 
Opposition to the employment of so many outsiders was first manifested in the Arubans resentment toward workers from nearby islands. These Caribbean off islanders held the better jobs because of language and experience. It was because of this opposition that Lago began a program to educate the Arubans in a company trade school. See footnote 1 at end.
1. Auke Visser=s
    Other Esso related Companies.
2.
    Mexican Petroleum, by Pan American Oil, 1922
3.Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in
    World War II by Standard Oil of New Jersey.
4.History of Standard Oil, New
    Horizons, 1927-1950, Chapter 13, Advancing Employee Relations